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Abstract
We study the liquid democracy problem, where each voter can ei-
ther directly vote to a candidate or delegate his voting power to a
proxy. We consider the implementation of liquid democracy on the
blockchain through Ethereum smart contract and to be compatible
with the realtime self-tallying property, where the contract itself can
record ballots and update voting status upon receiving each voting
massage. A challenge comes due to the gas fee limitation of Ethereum
mainnet, that the number of instruction for processing a voting mas-
sage can not exceed a certain amount, which restrict the application
scenario with respect to algorithms whose time complexity is linear to
the number of voters. We propose a fast algorithm to overcome the
challenge, such that i) shifts the on-chain initialization to off-chain
and ii) the on-chain complexity for processing each voting massage is
O(log n), where n is the number of voters.
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1 Introduction
Democracy has always been a widely concerned topic. Voting, as a pri-
mary method for realizing democracy in modern society, is more and more
common in practice, with applications ranging from the presidential elec-
tion to community governance [9, 16]. Meanwhile, various issues emerge due
to the current voting system, with low participation [3, 17] and black-box
operation[1, 12]1 to be two of the most significant. Now, a group of technol-
ogist are looking for a new approach to reform the voting system, bring all
people with voting rights closer to their representatives and holding elections
in a public, verifiable way. In other words, voters should exercise their rights
in every related voting, e.g. a policy issue or a piece of new legislation, in
which the voting status should be publicly displayed and traceable. However,
usually people do not have time for full participation, or they are not expert
with respect to the area involved by the voting proposal, which resulted in a
large number of voting powers not actually being exercised.
The concept liquid democracy (also known as proxy voting, delegate vot-
ing) is proposed to handle the participation issue, in which the core idea
is that, each voter (also called delegator) can select a personal representa-
tive who has the authority to be a proxy (also called delegate) for his vote.
Those delegates can further proxy their votes to other people, creating a di-
rected network graph (called delegate graph). Whenever a delegate votes to
a candidate (or a proposal, a policy), by default all his delegators’ (including
multi-level) voting powers are also cast to that candidate. If the delegator
dislikes the way in which the proxy voted, they can either vote themselves,
which dilutes the proxy’s power, or pick another delegate for the next vote.
Applying liquid democracy system significantly reduces time costs of voters
and increases voting participation, which has been studied over a long period
of time.
The early proposal about liquid democracy can be traced back to 1884
by Lewis Carroll [7], and followed by a number of economists [24, 19, 22].
Nowadays, many companies/parties also implement practical applications of
liquid democracy, such as Google votes [11], Pirate Parties (software: liquid
feedback) [2], etc. However, they are still centralized organization, where
black-box operation and statistical error are inevitable.
1According to [12] Black Box Voting is: “Any voting system in which the mechanism
for recording and/or tabulating the vote is hidden from the voter, and/or the mechanism
lacks a tangible record of the vote cast”
The introduction of blockchain [21] and on-chain smart contract technol-
ogy [25] satisfies the openess and transparency requirement of voting system.
Generally speaking, a blockchain is a decentralized and immutable public
ledger ensured by cryptography and P2P networking, storing data including
transaction information which is observerble by any user. The smart contract
is a pre-designed instruction set for storing and operating on-chain data, led
by Ethereum. The source code of the voting system can be deployed on the
Ethereum mainnet through smart contract and invoked through on-chain
transactions. The decentralization of blockchain gurantees that the voting
system are impartially executed without any need of trusted third party,
eradicating black-box operations.
A fundamental requirement of on-chain voting systems is realtime self-
tallying, which states that, for each incoming voting message, the contract
itself can record ballots2 and update the voting status (and display it). The
self-tallying property skips the trouble to download the whole Ethereum data
(and use it to off-chain compute the results, mainly for those who do not
participate the voting), or to collect majoritys signatures confirming a specific
voting status.3
However, the main challenge for realizing on-chain liquid democracy is the
limitation of gas fee on Ethereum mainnet, which is remain open4: executing
a single instruction of smart contracts consumes a certain amount of gas,
called gas fee, with the average about 10 thousand5. Whereas Ethereum has
a parameter block gas limit, usually about 10 million, which determines
the total gas that can be consumed within a block. That is, the total gas
fee for invoking a smart contract can not exceed block gas limit, because the
corresponding transaction can only be included in one block, which means
that number of instructions can not exceed 10 million/10 thousand = 1000,
otherwise the transaction will be refused.
The difficulty lies in the computation of two pieces of critical informa-
2We uses ballot to denote the number votes that a candidate receives.
3With the self-tallying property, users can visits the variables of a smart contract by
simply send RPC requests to Ethereum full nodes. Otherwise, without the support of any
centralized parties like etherscan.io, users need to download the full Ethereum in order to
obtain historical visiting data of the smart contract (current size more than 3.4TB).
4https://forum.aragon.org/t/open-challenges-for-on-chain-liquid-democracy/161
5According to https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-150.md,
one storage modify instruction costs 5000 gas, and one storage add instruction costs
20000 gas.
tion upon receiving a voting massage: i) the actual voting power that the
voter exercises, which would be reduced since some of his delegators may
already cast a direct vote, and ii) the change other candidates’ ballots, since
the voter’s direct vote also reduces the actual voting power of his delegate.
Naive algorithms usually compute the two values by traversing through the
delegate graph, of which the on-chain time complexity is O(n) for processing
each voting message, where n is the number of voters. Especially, when the
delegate graph is chain-like, they are undesirable due to the limitation of gas
fee, since application scenarios are limited to less than one thousand voters
(usually votings with millions of voters are required)
Some discussions try to solve the challenge by add restrictions to the
delegate graph, i.e., only allow the delegate graph with the max-depth less
than 100. This modification essentially limits voters’ behavior, which is lack
of user friendliness and does not catch the core of democracy. Moreover, this
method is vulnerable under attack: suppose Bob wants to prevent Alice from
delegating to anyone, he can create 98 accounts and form a delegate chain,
with the top node of the chain delegating to Alice. (Creating new accounts is
zero-cost in Ethereum) Anytime Alice delegates to a node, a 100-depth chain
is generated, thus the delegation will be refused. Other solutions abound but
all unreasonable when meet with the gas fee limitation.
In this paper we propose an algorithm that reduces the on-chain time
complexity to O(log n) for processing each voting information, which essen-
tially solves the on-chain liquid democracy problem. Our algorithm does
not add any restriction to voters: any voters can delegate arbitrary. Our
algorithm’s off-chain time complexity is also acceptable, only O(n).
Our algorithm mainly depends on two techniques, the Merkel tree, an on-
chain storage method, and the interval tree, a data structure. Our algorithm
solves the liquid democracy problem with the following aspect:
• At the beginning of a voting, each voter obtains the delegate graph
by snapshotting the current height of Ethereum, then executes a O(n)
off-chain initialization to get his initialization data.
• Each voter is not allowed to change his delegate within the period of a
voting, but he can directly vote to a candidate by send a voting mas-
sage, attached with his initiation data. The Merkel tree method checks
the correctness of the initiation data with O(log n) time complexity.
• Upon receiving a voting message, our algorithm requires O(log n) time
complexity for updating/displaying the voting status and storage, through
the interval tree structure.
Our on-chain algorithm excluding the Merkel tree part also enhances the
off-chain liquid democracy: if each voter votes once, then the time complexity
is O(n2) for traversal algorithms, while our algorithm is O(n log n). We focus
on the on-chain situation in the following of this paper.
1.1 Related Work
The Liquid Democracy Journal6 collects many valuable literature about
the liquid democracy problem, which begins at 2014 and almost information
about latest progress can be found there. Blum and Zuber[4] give an overview
liquid democracy, include the concepts, the history and problems. Recently,
a few technical papers also are interested in liquid democracy. Anson et
al. [14] analyze the problem that whether there exists a delegate voting
that outperforms direct voting, for the situation where there are a correct
candidate and an incorrect candidate. Brill and Talmon [6] study the case
where a voter can delegate to several proxies and specify a partial order.
They propose a way to overcome the complications of individual rational.
Christoff and Grossi [8] analyze liquid democracy within the theory of binary
aggregation, and consider the issues of individual rational and delegate cycle.
Recently, a series of literature studies the implementation of on-chain
voting system [10, 13], some of which also refer to liquid democracy but
not consider the self-tally requirement. The introduction of self-tally can be
found in [15], which states that the property of self-tally and perfect ballot
secrecy can not be satisfied simultaneously. Thus in this paper the privacy is
compromised in favor of realtime self-tallying. Yang et al.[26] introduce a self-
tallying voting system by Ethereum smart contract, but do not consider the
liquid democracy scenario. McCorry et al. [18] also implement a distributed
and self-tally electronic voting scheme using the Ethernet blockchain, while
the core is to maximize the protection of voter privacy.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first O(log n) algorithm
solving the on-chain liquid democracy problem, while the algorithms in Google
vote and liquid feedback work in following ways: Google vote’s algorithm
mainly bases on the work of Schulze’s [23], which is a m3 method for elect-
ing a winner, where m is the number of candidates. They also demonstrate
6https://liquid-democracy-journal.org/
that the system can implement liquid democracy on a social network in a
scalable manner with a gradual learning curve. The basics of Liquid Feed-
back’s algorithm comes from Harmonic Weight7, Proportional Runoff8 and
Schulze method, whose proposes are to determine the weights of candidates.
Though both algorithms can be applied to liquid democracy, the self-tallying
requirement and gas fee limitation are not taken into consideration.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Problem Description
Suppose there are n voters, indexed by numbers 1, 2, ..., n, and m candi-
dates, indexed by capital letters A,B,C, .... We separate the liquid democ-
racy problem into three periods:
• Spare period During spare period, no voting is hold. Each voter
can arbitrarily delegate, undelegate and change delegate, by sending a
massage (transaction) to the blockchain, which is stored in the delegate
contract. Each voter is allowed to appoint at most one delegate.
• Prepare period In prepare period, a specific voting is to be hold.
The holder needs to deploy the voting contract and the delegate graph
and each voters voting powers need to be constructed. In the following
example we regard the delegate graph as input, while in the next section
we will show how the voting powers are determined and how to handle
the case where there is a cycle in the delegate graph.
• Voting period After the voting begins, each voter can directly vote
to a candidate by sending a voting message, with all his delegators’
voting powers also cast to that candidate (which may also reduce the
vote of the candidate that his delegate votes). The on-chain voting
status are updated for each voting message and need to be displayed.
For convenience, we assume that each voter can only vote once during
each voting activity, while our algorithm also fits for the case where
each voter can change his vote. A voter’s delegate is not allowed to
change during voting period.
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harmonic mean
8http://www.magnetkern.de/prop-runoff/prop-runoff.html
It is notable that, although our algorithm does not allow voters to change
their delegates during the voting period, they can accomplish the same thing
by casting a direct vote. Changing delegate to a voter that has voted is
equivalent to casting a direct vote and changing delegate to a voter that has
not voted is rare in practice. Actually, a voter wants to change his delegate
during the voting period usually because he dislikes the way his delegate
votes, which means that he has a better candidate in mind and is better off
to vote by himself, and he has the time to do so.
The following example abstracts how voting status changes upon receiving
voting massages during voting period. Suppose a (direct, no-cycle) delegate
graph G = (V,E) is given, where each node represents a voter, and a direct
edge (u, v) represents that voter v delegates to voter u. We will use terms
“voter” and “node” interchangeably in the following of this paper. Since by
assumption there is no cycle in G, thus G is a forest (multiple trees). For
convenience, we add a virtual node (indexed 0) that is pointed by the root of
each connected branch. So G is transferred to tree T , as Figure 1. That is,
there are 12 voters. We further assume that each voter’s voting power equals
to his index.
• At the beginning, nobody votes. When voter 1 votes for candidate A
(as the first voter), A obtains 1 + 2 + ... + 12 = 78 votes.
• After voter 1 votes, suppose voter 5 (as the second voter) votes for
candidate B. Then B obtains 6 + 5 = 11 votes. A’s vote decreases by
11, turning into 67.
• Further, voter 3 (as the third voter) votes for candidate C, then C
obtains 3 + 4 + 7 + 8 = 22 votes, A’s vote becomes 45, and B’s vote is
still 11.
Goal: For each voting massage, display the votes of all candidates. (Sup-
pose m < 100)
input output
1 A A 78 B 0 C 0
5 B A 67 B 11 C 0
3 C A 45 B 11 C 22
19
121110
2
3
7
8
4
5
6
A
B
Figure 1: Tree T . We ignore the virtual node with index 0 here.
2.2 Blockchain and Smart Contract
The smart contract of Ethereum supports Turing-complete programming
language, which is deployed on the blockchain [5]. Users invoke a smart
contract by sending a transaction to the smart contract’s address, which
contains additional information including the gas fee of the transaction and
other incoming parameters, which would further be included in a block. As
shown in section 1, the gas fee of a valid transaction are limited by the fixed
parameter block gas limit, so that the number of instructions of the smart
contract are also bounded. That is the so-called ”on-chain” time complexity.
In this paper, we use “voting massage” to represent the transaction that
invokes the voting contract, whose on-chain time complexity are required
to be sub-linear to the number of voters. Ethereum clients obtain latest
on-chain data through P2P network and implement smart contracts locally
through the Etheruem virtual machine (EVM). Thus, the space limitation
of a smart contract only depends on Ethereum nodes’ (clients) local storage,
which is not an issue in this paper.
It is important to distinguish on-chain smart contract and (open source)
cloud computation. The later is still realized by centralized servers, which
can not guarantee the codes are correctly executed, while in Ethereum, there
is no ”center” for executing smart contract: they are executed by every
Ethereum node, which is reliable as long as the majority of nodes are honest.
Figure 2: Merkel tree, where hA/B/C/D refers to the hash value of data
A/B/C/D. The black nodes represent the Merkel path of data A.
2.3 Merkel Tree
The Merkel Tree is a common used method for store and verifying on-
chain data. One of the key tools is the hash function, h(), which is (crypto-
graphically) hard to find collisions and for inverse computation (In Ethereum,
SHA3-256 is used). The Merkel tree is a full binary tree, where each leaf node
stores the hash value of data to be stored (see Figure 2.3). The value of an
intermediate node is the hash value of the combination of its two children.
The use of Merkel tree is that, the blockchain only need to store the root
of the Merkel tree. In order to proof that a data (say data A in the Figure
2.3)belongs to the Merkel tree, A along with its Merkel path (also called
Merkel Proof) are required:
Merkel path, which is defined to be a sequence of nodes in the Merkel
tree that corresponds to brother of each node on path from A’s leaf node
to the root. For example, data A’s Merkel path is (hB, hCD). A leaf node
together with its correct Merkel path can recover the root of the Merkel tree
(called Merkel root). The length of the Merkel path and the time complexity
for recovering the Merkel root are all logarithmic to the number of leaf nodes
of the Merkel tree. The one-wayness of the hash function guarantees that it
1
[1, 12]
3
[7, 12]
7
[10, 12]
6
[7, 9]
2
[1, 6]
5
[4, 6]
11
[6, 6]
10
[4, 5]
21
[5, 5]
20
[4, 4]
4
[1, 3]
9
[3, 3]
8
[1, 2]
17
[2, 2]
16
[1, 1]
... ...
Figure 3: The interval tree of all nodes
is hard to construct a correct Merkel path for any data that does not belong
to any leaf nodes of the Merkel tree.
2.4 Interval Tree
Interval tree is also a binary tree, where each node represents a interval
and the interval of a parent node is uniformly distributed to its two child
nodes, until the interval becomes a singular, to be a leaf node. See Figure 3
for the interval tree of the 12 nodes in Figure 1. The root are indexed 1 and
for node k, its child nodes are indexed 2k, 2k + 1 respectively. Note that,
although some indexes, e.g. 18,19 in Figure 2.3, does not exist, the space is
still used.
Interval tree is usually used for maintaining an array where the operations
are aiming at a successive interval. Given the interval to be updated, the
execution begins at the root node, then the interval are separated to one or
two sub-intervals. which are recursively executed at the child notes, guaran-
teeing that the sub-intervals to be update belongs to interval of current node.
The recursion ends when the interval to be update equals to the interval of
current node. For example, when interval [4,8] is to be update, beginning at
the root, it separates to [4,6] and [7,8], which are executed at note 2 and 3
respectively. The recursion ends at node 5 and node 12 (which are omitted
in Figure 3).
Interval tree supports find and update operation. For update operation,
usually not every leaf node is updated since the update information may
stop at an intermediate node, recorded as lazy-tag, which means that it is
temporarily suspended and will be executed in subsequent operations. Find
operations need to be executed recursively starting from the root, and trigger
the pass-down operation of all lazy-tags until the leaf node is reached. The
complexity is O(log n) with respect to interval tree for both operations. We
refer [20], Chapter 10.1 to readers for more detail.
3 Algorithm
3.1 Overview
In order to real-time display the voting status, the core of our algorithm
is to record and maintain each node’s “lost voting power”, initially valued
zero. When a voter votes, his actual voting power is his total voting power
minus his lost voting power. Meanwhile, some other voters’ lost voting power
should be updated after he votes. As long as each voter’s “lost voting power”
can be updated within O(log n), the liquid democracy problem can be solved.
See again the example in Figure 1,
• After voter 1 votes for candidate A, all other voters’ lost voting powers
do not change.
• After voter 5 votes for candidate B, B’s votes actually increase by
11 − 0 = 11 (voter 5’s total voting power minus lost voting power).
Meanwhile, voter 2,3,4’s lost voting powers all increase by 11. Lost
voting powers of other voters that have not voted yet do not change
(lost voting powers for voters that have voted is meaningless since each
voter can only vote once).
• After voter 3 votes for candidate C, C’s votes actually increase by
33 − 11 = 22 (voter 3’s total voting power minus lost voting power).
Meanwhile, voter 2’s lost voting power increase by 22. Lost voting
powers of other voters that have not voted yet do not change.
It is not hard to get the following observation:
Observation 1. When a voter votes, a node’s lost voting power needs to be
updated if and only if the node lines on the path from the voter to the voter’s
nearest parent node that has voted (we call it nearest voted parent for short,
and voter 0 is regarded as voted. Note that in a tree, there is one and only
one path from a node to one of his parent).
In the example, when voter 5 votes, the nearest voted parent is 1, so all
nodes on the path (5) → 4 → 3 → 2 → (1) are to be updated. When voter
3 votes, nodes on the path (3)→ 2→ (1) are to be updated.
So the main two goals of our algorithm are:
1. Find the voter’s nearest voted parent.
2. Update lost voting powers of nodes on the path from the voter to the
voter’s nearest voted parent.
However, both 1 and 2 need to traverse the graph in traditional method,
whose time complexity is O(n) when the depth of the graph is high (say,
chain like). Our solution is to use the interval tree to achieve O(log n), and
use Merkel tree to for initialization.
The following two sequences are used, the preorder sequence and the
bracket sequence.
• Preorder sequence, that is, traverse the tree in the order of root→ leaf
and record the nodes. In Figure 1, the preorder sequence is 1 2 3 ... 12,
that is, each node’s index equals to its index of the preorder sequence.
• Bracket sequence, that is, still traverse the tree in preorder but record
the nodes when entering and exiting it respectively. In Figure 1, the
bracket sequence is 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 5 4 7 8 8 7 3 2 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 9 1.
Our algorithm consists of the following three parts.
• In prepare period, each voter locally do an initialization of all voters’
data, including their total voting powers, index of the preorder se-
quence, index of the bracket sequence and so on. The data are submit
to the voting contract together with voters’ voting massages, and are
checked by the Merkel root (Section 3.3).
• For each voting massage, find the voter’s nearest voted parent, based
on the interval tree with respect to the preorder sequence (3.5).
• For each voting massage, update lost voting powers of nodes on the
path from the voter to the voter’s nearest voted parent, based on the
interval tree with respect to the bracket sequence (3.6).
3.2 Notations
We have the following variables:
• T : The delegate tree, which is generated and stored off-chain.
• n: Number of nodes, as well as the length of the preorder sequence
(called preorder index for short).
• n0: Length of the bracket sequence.
• node: A type, representing the voters.
• node.stake: Node’s voting power, which is given from the snapshot.
• node.index: Index of the node in the pre-order sequence.
• node.address: The Ethereum address of the node, which is an inherent
parameter.
• b[]: Mapping from a node’s preorder index to the node.
• nearestparent[]: Mapping from a node’s preorder index to its nearest
voted parent’s preorder index.
• s[]: The score of the bracket sequence (showed in the following).
• node.endpoint: The maximum preorder index among the node’s chil-
dren (include multi-level).
• node.left: The first index where the node appears in the bracket se-
quence.
• node.right: The second index where the node appears in the bracket
sequence.
• node.power: Node’s total voting power (including its children’s).
• node.candidate: The candidate that the voter votes.
• v[]: Recording the votes of candidates.
• lazy1[]: Lazy-tag of the interval tree with respect to the preorder se-
quence, which also reflects the index of the nearest voted parent.
• lazy2[]: Lazy-tag of the interval tree with respect to the bracket se-
quence, which also reflects the “score” of the sequence.
All variables are global and initially valued 0 unless otherwise stated. For
other intermediate variables we will illustrate in the following subsection.
3.3 Spare and Prepare Period
Spare Period
A perpetual smart contract, called the delegate contract, are established.
It has two methods:
• Delegate(), voters call this method to appoint a delegate, or to undel-
egate (by delegate to an empty address). Before that, we recommend
a protocol that each voter locally downloads the blockchain data and
checks whether his delegate operation generates a cycle in the delegate
graph. If so, the voter should change his delegate. The protocol can
be integrated in the client.
• V ote(), a holder calls this method to start a voting, and deploys a new
smart contract, called the voting contract, which will be introduced in
the following. After that, the prepare period begins.
Prepare Period
a) At the beginning of the prepare period, all on-chain information are
snapshotted by the current height of the blockchain, mainly, each voter’s
delegate and stake. Then, each voter involved in the voting locally con-
structs the delegate tree T and gets all voters’ voting powers according to
the following rule.
• For each voter, get his last delegate operation from the snapshot and
add the corresponding direct edge to the delegate graph. Then for
all edges that are on a cycle, delete the latest edge. Then repeat the
deletion until the delegate graph has no cycle9. After that, add an
edge from each zero-outdegree node to the virtual node, resulting in
the delegate tree T . Since the rule is deterministic, all voters obtain a
same delegate tree. We show in next section that the construction rule
is incentive compatible for voters,
• Usually in a decentralized authority organization (DAO), a voter’s vot-
ing power equals to one of his stake on the blockchain (say, one kind
of ERC-20 token). So all voters’ voting powers can be obtained from
the snapshot (node.stake in the notation). There are other off-chain
method in practice to distribute voting powers, which is not critical of
our paper as long as all voters can reach an agreement.
b) After the construction of T , we use T.root to denote the root of T , i.e.,
the virtual node. Then, each voter locally call Preorder(child), to obtain
initialization data. (n and n0 is initialed −1 to exclude the virtual node).
Intrinsically, a preorder traversal are executed, and all nodes’ initializa-
tion data are computed simultaneously.
c) Each voter construct the Merkel root according the initialization data,
where the information of each leaf node is hash(node.adddress, node.power,
node.index, node.endpoint, node.leftbracket, node.rightbracket), representing
the initialization data of a voter. The leaf nodes are ordered according to
node.index so that each voter’s local Merkel tree are identical. The Merkel
root are hard-coded in the voting contract. (If the voting holder makes
a mistake of the Merkel root, every voter can choose to ignore the voting
contract and remind the holder to deploy a new contract)
After step (c), the prepare period is over and the voting period begins.
9All transactions in Ethereum are attached with a time stamp. The time order on the
blockchain is define that, if a transaction’s block height is larger than another trasaction,
then the former is later than the latter. If two transaction have the same block height,
the transaction with the larger timestamp are later. The rule of Etherum guarantees that
the timestamp can not be forged too far from the actual time otherwise the transaction is
infeasible
Procedure Preorder(Node root);
n← n + 1;
n0 ← n0 + 1;
root.left← n0;
root.index← n;
root.power ← root.stake;
for node in root’s direct child do
Preorder(node) root.power ← root.power + node.power;
root.endpoint← n;
n0 ← n0 + 1;
root.right← n0;
3.4 Voting Period
In this subsection, we describe the voting contract to process each direct
voting massage.
d) When a voter casts a direct vote, he sends a voting message which
contains (data, proof, node.candidate), where data=(node.power, node.index,
node.endpoint, node.leftbracket, node.rightbracket) (here the node corresponds
to the voter), the initialization data about himself.
e) Upon receiving a voting massage (data, proof, node.candidate), the
voting contract first obtains the sender’s Ethereum address, to check if it
matches with node.address in data. If it matches, then the contract recovers
a root according to data and proof , and checks if the result matches to the
Merkel root stored in the contract. If matches. the contract begins to process
the voting massage, otherwise returns an “error” response.
f) The Algorithm 1 shows the main procedure for processing a voting
massage, which consists of the following instructions:
• Compute the voter’s lost voting power.
• Define t to be the voter’s total voting power minus lost voting power,
which represents his actual votes.
• Find the voter’s nearest voted parent, and then update other voters’
nearest voterd parent (only the voter’s children are affected).
Algorithm 1: Vote: upon receiving a voting message
Input: node: voter
Input: data, proof, node.candidate
if not check(RootHash, proof, data) then
return;
b[node.index] = node;
update2(node.left, node.left, 1, 2n, 1, 0)//Find the value of node’s
leftbracket;
update2(node.right, node.right, 1, 2n, 1, 0)//Find the value of node’s
rightbracket;
int t = node.power − s[node.left] + s[node.right];
C[node.candidate]+ = t;
update1(node.index, node.index, 1, n, 1, 0)//Find the node’s nearest
parent;
Node parent = b[nearestparent[node.index]];
C[parent.candndate]− = t;
update1(node.index + 1, node.endpoint, 1, n, 1, node.index)//Update
nearest voted parents;
update2(parent.left, node.left, 1, 2n, 1, t)
//Update scores;
Output C[]
• The ballot of the candidate that the voter’s nearest parent votes de-
creases by t.
• Update the lost voting powers of the nodes on the path from the voter
to the voter’s nearest voted parent.
So far, the total procedure of algorithm is produced. In the next two subsec-
tions we will introduce the two functions update1(), update2()
3.5 Find the Nearest Voted Parent
The function update1() achieves the goal of finding the voter’s nearest
voted parent, by implementing the update operation of the interval tree with
respect to the preorder sequence. The lazy-tag of the interval tree’s leaf node
records the preorder index of corresponding voter’s nearest voted parent.
The following three observations are sufficient for the correctness:
Observation 2.
• A node’s preorder index is always larger than its children’s.
• Preoroder indexes of a node’s children are successive to the node’s pre-
order index.
• When a voter votes, only his children’s nearest voted parents need to be
updated, which should be at least the voter’s preorder index.
For a node (voter), indexes from node.index+ 1 to node.endpoint repre-
sents the preorder indexes of its children, whose nearest voted parent need
to be updated. Since they form a successive interval, the interval tree is
applicable.
• update1(node.index+1, node.endpoint,1,n,1,node.index) uses the voter’s
preorder index to do maximum-value update to (preorder indexes of)
all its children’s nearest voted parent (if the current value is less than
the incoming parameter, then replace).
• update1(node.index,node.index,1,n,1,0) finds and records the node’s near-
est voted parent (recorded in nearestparent[]). The value used for
update is zero since no additional updating is needed (just trigger the
pass-down operation of lazy-tags). Note that if there is no voted parent
then 0 is record, the default value.
procedure update1(int L, int R, int l, int r, int k, int v)
//[L,R] are the interval to be updated, [l, r] is the current interval of
the interval tree node, k is the index of interval tree node and v is the
value for updating.
if L = l and R = r then
if v > lazy1[k] then
lazy1[k]← v
if L = R then
nearestparent[L]← lazy1[k]
//Recursion ends when updating interval equals to current node’s
interval, and then updating the value of the interval
else
int m← (l + r)/2;
if lazy1[2k] < lazy1[k] then
lazy1[2k]← lazy1[k]
if lazy1[2k + 1] < lazy1[k] then
lazy1[2k + 1]← lazy1[k]//pass down the lazy-tag
if L ≤ m then
update1(L,min{m,R}, l,m, 2k, v)
if R > m then
update1(max{m + 1, L}, R,m + 1, r, 2k + 1, v)
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Figure 4: Updating a path
3.6 Update the Lost Voting Power
When a voter votes, all nodes on the path from the voter to its nearest
voted parented should update their lost voting powers. See Figure 4, if voter
8 votes after voter 1 votes, then path 7 → 3 → 2 → 1 should be updated.
However it is not a successive interval in the preorder sequence.
We use the bracket sequence to handle this problem. A bracket sequence
is to record each node twice in the pre-order traversal, one for enter and one
for exit, called left bracket and right bracket respectively. For Figure 4, the
bracket sequence is
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6, 5, 4, 7, 8, 8, 7, 3, 2, 9, 10, 10, 11, 11, 12, 12, 9, 1
For a direct path starts from u and ends at v, define the path’s bracket
interval to be indexed from v.leftbracket to u.leftbreacket. The following
observation shows the property of the bracket interval:
Observation 3. Given a direct path, for any node that does not lie on the
path, it occur twice or does not occur in the path’s bracket interval. For any
node that lies on the path, it occur exactly once in the path’s bracket interval.
Moreover, only the nodes first appearance lies in the interval.
For example, suppose the path from 8 to 1 is to be updated, its bracket
interval is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6, 5, 4, 7, 8 (index 1-11). Nodes 4,5,6,11,12 do not lie
on the path, so they occur twice or do not occur in the interval. Nodes
1,2,3,7,8 lie in the path, so they occur once in the interval.
We then define an array s[] for recording the so-called “score” of the
bracket sequence. Given a path where the nodes’ lost voting powers need
to add some value, we add that value into the scores of the path’s bracket
interval. Then for a node’s lost voting power, we can compute it by
s[node.left]− s[node.right]
The reason is that, when we increase the score, only the nodes on the path
increase their lost voting powers (only the leftbracket increases). For a node
outside the path, the scores either does not change or both its leftbraket and
rightbracket increase by the same value, thus the lost voting power does not
change.
We construct another interval tree with respect to the bracket sequence
and maintain the score, recorded in the variable lazy2[] of leaf nodes. The
function update2() gives the implementation.
procedure update2(int L, int R, int l, int r, int k, int v)
if L = l and R = r then
lazy2[k]← lazy2[k] + v;
if L = R then
s[L]← lazy2[k]
else
int m← (l + r)/2;
lazy2[2k]← lazy2[2k] + lazy2[k];
lazy2[2k + 1]← lazy2[2k + 1] + lazy2[k];
lazy2[k]← 0 //pass down the lazy-tag;
if L ≤ m then
update2(L,min{m,R}, l,m, 2k, v)
if R > m then
update2(max{m + 1, L}, R,m + 1, r, 2k + 1, v)
• update2(node.left,node.left,1,2n,1,0) finds the score of the node’s left-
bracket (recorded in the array s[]). Similar for the rightbracket.
• update2(parent.left, node.left,1,2n,1,t) update the score of the bracket
interval of the path from the voter to its nearest parent.
So far our algorithm is introduced. In the next section we prove some theo-
rems.
4 Theorem
In this section we prove some properties of our algorithm. We first analyze
our protocol for constructing the delegate graph.
Lemma 1. If a voter’s delegate operation does not generate a cycle of the
delegate graph (locally checked), then the corresponding edge will never be
deleted.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the delegate edge is deleted. By defi-
nition, there must be a cycle such that the delegate edge is the latest, which
means that the cycle are generated by the appearance of the delegate edge,
contradiction.
It means that, if the voter follows the protocol, then his delegation are
garanteed to be retained, which is benefit for him. Otherwise if he deviates
(his delegation generates a cycle), his delegation may be deleted. (It is also
possible to be retained, if other voters further change their delegate and
remove the cycle)
Lemma 2. If a voter deviates from our mechanism, by sending a delegate
edge that generates a cycle, then further, this edge will not cause other voter’s
delegate edge to be refused if they follows the protocol.
Proof. We call the delegate edge of the dishonest voter edge A. We prove
that, if an edge B is refused with the existence of edge A, then it will also
be refused without the existence of edge A.
Since B is refused, it lies on a cycle which contains A. Since A also lies
on another cycle, if A is delete, B still lies on a cycle, and should be refused
according to the protocol. The lemma is proved.
The lemma shows that, even if a voter deviates from the protocol, other
voters are not influenced.
There are also sublinear-time algorithms that can judge whether a cycle
is generated for a incoming delegate edge, which can be used in smart con-
tract. However it is more complex and require more gas fee for each delegate
massage. So still our protocol is recommended in practice.
Next, we introduce our main theorem:
Theorem 1. For each voting massage in liquid democracy problem, the vot-
ing status can be updated and displayed within O(log n) time complexity.
Moreover, our algorithm can be deploy on the Ethereum mainnet and over-
come the gas limitation, for the number of voters more than one million.
The theorem is obvious according to the properties of the tools we used.
Here we illustrate some issues.
• Processing a voter’s voting message does not rely on the initialization
data of other voters that has not voted, since our algorithm only re-
quires the data from the nearest voted parent.
• The “mapping” structure in Solidity (the coding language of Ethereum
smart contract) satisfies that, the storages are allocated only if they
are assigned values. For example, the storage lazy[3] can be allocated
without the allocation of lazy[1] and lazy[2]. Moreover, lazy[1] and
lazy[2] still can be visit but always returned a default value 0, which
is just the requirement of our algorithm.
• The time complexity of update operation in interval tree is O(log n),
since at each level of the interval tree, at most two intervals are at the
recursive state: after the interval to be updated is first time separated
to two sub-intervals, there are at least one endpoints of the interval to
be update are the same as the endpoints of the interval of current node.
So at the next level, either there are only one interval to be executed,
or there are two intervals, but one of them is identical to the interval
of the next interval tree node, and the recursion ends.
For the part of Ethereum, we leave the proof in the experiment section.
5 Experiment
We compare between our algorithm and traversal algorithm (implemented
by ourselves) by recording the maximum consumed gas fee. Since in practice
the only requirement is that the consumed gas fee should be strictly limited
by related Ethereum parameter, we focus on extreme cases that produce the
maximum consumed gas fee.
We assume that the delegate graph is a chain, which turns out to be the
extreme case of consumed gas fee. We also consider extreme cases where the
voter comes from the head/tail of the chain, which is possible to produce the
maximum consumed gas fee for both algorithm.
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Figure 5: Voting by the head.
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Figure 6: Voting by the tail.
We conduct the evaluation on Ganache, which is a personal blockchain
for Ethereum development that can be used to deploy contracts, and run
tests. Our implementation can be found here 10.
Our comparison is from two aspects. 1) The voter is the head of the
delegate chain, as illustrated in Fig. 5; 2) the voter is the tail of the delegate
chain , as shown in Fig. 6.. The gas limit is about 6,700,000 according to
Ganache. Our evaluation shows that
• the traversal algorithm performs better when the delegate chain is
short, like smaller than 100;
• our algorithm significantly outperforms the traversal algorithm when
the delegate chain is long enough;
10https://github.com/freeof123/liquid-voting/tree/master/ether-eval/
contracts
• our algorithm can scale up with very limited gas increasing, while the
traversal algorithm reaches the gas limit when the delegate chain grows
up to 1,000.
.
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